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BLURRED LINES
Gray-Zone Conflict and Hybrid War—Two Failures of American
Strategic Thinking
Donald Stoker and Craig Whiteside

A

mong today’s great ironies is that, despite the fact that the United States has
been at war for the better part of two decades, rare is the American policy
maker who speaks adeptly about our use of military power in a coherent manner.
On the one hand, political leaders attempt to avoid categorizing our air strikes
and raids targeting al-Qaeda and the Islamic State in countries around the world
as war, while on the other hand they conflate hostile Russian acts with some form
of hyphenated war. This article argues that the adoption of two prominent and
fashionable theoretical terms and their various iterations—the gray zone or grayzone conflict (usually described as the space between peace and war) and hybrid
war (often described as Russia’s new form of mixed-methods warfare birthed
by General Valery Gerasimov)—is an example of an American failure to think
clearly about political, military, and strategic issues and their vitally important
connections.
These terms, as well as the concepts arising from them, should be eliminated
from the strategic lexicon. They cause more harm than good and contribute to an
increasingly dangerous distortion of the concepts of war, peace, and geopolitical
competition, with a resultant negative impact on the crafting of security strategy
for the United States and its allies and partners around the world.
If an effort to eliminate two such commonly accepted terms and the theoretical approaches arising from them seems a fruitless effort to corral the contents of
Pandora’s box, then examine the most recent U.S. National Security Strategy and
National Defense Strategy.1 You will not find either term in these documents even
though, as we will see, both have appeared regularly in U.S. political and strategy
documents for years. This demonstrates that it is possible to discuss security
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challenges without reliance on problematic terms that confuse strategic issues
rather than clarify them. This is what we hope to achieve in this article.
There are four key problems with gray-zone conflict and hybrid war and the
related variations of each.
1.	 They are examples of poorly constructed new theories that more often
than not cloud rather than clarify.
2.	 They distort or ignore history, sometimes by claiming to be new when we
have seen similar confusion in the past.
3.	 They feed a dangerous tendency to confuse war and peace.
4.	 They undermine U.S. strategic thinking via the construction of critical
political and strategic documents on the basis of flawed ideas, even
sometimes resulting in strategic guidance derived from a focus on tactical
matters.
After almost two decades of war, we should heed the lessons that writers such
as Emile Simpson learned firsthand in Afghanistan: “What liberal powers do by
blurring the conceptual boundaries between war and peace is often to militarise
in a polarised manner pre-established patterns of political activity, which might
otherwise not be part of the wider conflict.”2 As we will see, part of the cure for a
poor understanding of some of our geopolitical problems is not to confuse geopolitics, competition among adversaries, or ham-handed influence efforts with
war. The United States (and its allies) survived the Cold War (what some have
termed more accurately the Cold Peace) without confusing whether it was at war
or at peace with the Soviet Union—when such confusion could have produced
nuclear Armageddon. We need to relearn how to make this distinction.
A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS
To support these claims, we must do something of fundamental importance:
establish the basis for our discussion. This will give us a firm foundation for
analysis, because without a secure base one cannot evaluate terms and concepts
consistently and rationally. This is important because what some advocates of hybrid and gray-zone ideas are doing is elevating the importance of these concepts
to being a new theory of war. Proposing supposedly new tools or methods for
analysis is to present new theory. How do we judge whether this theory is valid,
rigorous, and testable?
Carl von Clausewitz gave us the first steps. “The primary purpose of any
theory is to clarify concepts and ideas that have become, as it were, confused and
entangled.”3 Theory, as Sir Julian Corbett tells us, “can assist a capable man to
acquire a broad outlook.” Theory should teach us to think critically, to analyze,
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2020
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to bring a questioning but informed eye to the problem at hand, and to consider
both its depth and breadth. It provides conceptual tools and grounds us by defining our terms and providing us a firm foundation for analysis, while teaching us
to distinguish between what is important and what is not.4
The results of theory, Clausewitz insists, “must have been derived from military history, or at least checked against it,” thus ensuring “that theory will have
to remain realistic. It cannot allow itself to get lost in futile speculation, hairsplitting, and flights of fancy.” Most importantly, particularly in any theory addressing warfare, it “is meant to educate the mind of the future commander.”5
Historian Peter Paret has made similar points. “A theory that is logically and
historically defensible, and that reflects present reality, has the pedagogic function of helping the student organize and develop his ideas on war, which he draws
from experience, study, and from history—the exploration of the past extends the
reality that any one individual can experience.”6
A way to conceptualize the relationship between the political objective and
how a state uses its power to obtain that objective is to view these elements as
distinct but interrelated realms. The graphic below is presented as an analytical
tool. We start with the political objective, or the political aim. As Clausewitz, Corbett, and other theorists make clear, nations and peoples go to war for political
FIGURE 1
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE POLITICAL OBJECTIVE AND THE USE OF POWER
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reasons; there is something they want to achieve, or they want to protect what
they have.7 Some (e.g., the Islamic State) might mask these objectives in religious
terms or various euphemisms, but in the end when states go to war they are using violence to get something they want—violence that is inherently political in
nature. To ignore this is to ignore the very essence of every war, and to forget
that bloodshed is involved is to refuse to accept war’s nature. It certainly is true
that states also pursue political objectives without resorting to war; one wishes
this were the preferred method, but the sweep of history demonstrates a human
predilection for war. Elaboration of the political objective also should include a
vision of what victory looks
like and what it means; this vi[W]hen new terms appear . . . they must be
sion almost always is lacking.
tested immediately against history and existWhen nations pursue their
ing theory. Most new so-called classifications
political
objectives—whether
of war would be instantly killed if properly
defensive or offensive, and
examined through these lenses.
whether at peace or at war—
they use various elements of national power to try to achieve them. This is
the realm of grand strategy.8 Here we find the tools of the state beyond merely
military power. Sometimes this is represented by the acronym DIME (diplomatic, informational, military, economic). This is not a bad way to think about
grand strategy, but one should not forget internal political influence on national
decision-making as well. This method grants analytical breadth and firmness and
applies to the pursuit of political objectives in both peace and war.9
The term strategy too often is used without bothering to define it. Military
strategy generally is discussed in the context of warfare, but strategy certainly
applies to peacetime as well. For our purposes, strategy is defined as the larger
use of military power in the pursuit of a political objective. It is how a nation
uses military power to get what it wants—whether at peace or at war—and is
the military element of grand strategy. Some examples of a state’s use of military
power include deterrence, reassurance, and coercive acts of force using strategies
of annihilation, attrition, exhaustion, or protraction.
When military power is used in war, operations are the campaigns one conducts to implement a strategy. Operational art is the way one conducts these
campaigns and is defined by the U.S. Army as “the pursuit of strategic objectives,
in whole or in part, through the arrangement of tactical actions in time, space,
and purpose.”10 Operations should support the implementation of strategy. They
also should affect the enemy’s will or material ability to wage war. It is better if
they do both. If your operations are doing neither of these, then you must question their efficacy and whether you understand the use of force, and realize that
you are wasting time, resources, and, more importantly, lives.
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2020
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Tactics, or the tactical realm, deal with how military forces directly fight the enemy. Weapons technologies and methods for using them drive tactics more than any
other factor, and the constant roiling of technology means tactics never stand still.
Also relevant to this discussion is the so-called spectrum of conflict. This is
a commonly used term that seeks to classify the interaction among nations (at
war or not), often (but not always) by the scale and type of means being used.11
Soldier-scholar Harry Summers pointed out that this notion entered the U.S.
military lexicon as the “spectrum of war” via the U.S. Army’s 1962 Field Service
Regulations. Then the spectrum stretched from cold war to limited war. Summers
correctly identified a “serious flaw”: the spectrum fails to delineate between war
and peace.12
This type of defective thinking continues to feed current American misconceptions as we continue to confuse war and peace, something manifest in the
discussions of hybrid war, gray-zone war, and so-called cyber war. In a 2016
article, Lieutenant General James Dubik, USA (Ret.), made an argument similar
to that of Summers, observing that U.S. leaders are fuzzy about just what war is, a
problem fed by the 1994 adoption (really, readoption) of a spectrum-of-conflict
approach to strategic analysis.13
Objecting to using this inaccurate analytical tool does not, as some argue,
merely “perpetuate the binary peace/war distinction.”14 It is in reality an insistence on clear analysis and an embrace of the notion that peace and war are not
the same. Their relationship is not binary; it is dialectical. War and peace are best
defined in opposition to one another, as one is the antithesis of the other. If a state
is engaged in armed conflict, it is at war. The armed conflict can be with another
state or not. Clausewitz famously defines war as “an act of force,” one intended
to achieve a political object. Lukas Milevski cogently observes that Clausewitz’s
definition “elegantly encapsulates the three most important elements of war: violence, instrumentality,” and its adversarial nature. If the state is not in an armed
conflict, it is at peace. Thomas Hobbes tells us that peace is the absence of war.15
War should not be confused with warfare, which usually is defined as the undertaking of the military actions themselves.
Understanding this is critical because we begin our analysis with the question
whether the nation is at war. One must remember, though, that nations can be
in competition with one another and not be at war and involved in killing the
soldiers (and usually civilians) of the other state. Competition among all states,
friendly or not, is a norm—and to be preferred. But allowing our analysis of wars
or competition among states to rest on intellectual constructs that fail to honor
the critical distinction between war and peace means we have lost the logical
foundation for critical analysis.

https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol73/iss1/4

6

18

NAVA L WA R C O L L E G E R E V I E W

Stoker and Whiteside: Blurred Lines: Gray-Zone Conflict and Hybrid War—Two Failures of

Having established a solid analytical foundation, why do we say what we do
about gray-zone conflict and hybrid war? Our analysis will start with a deconstruction of the more expansive term: gray-zone conflict.
GRAY-ZONE CONFLICT—CONFUSION IN BLACK AND WHITE
Commentators frequently use the gray zone phrase to describe the war Vladimir
Putin launched against Ukraine in 2014, implying that the actions were opaque
enough to cloud perceptions about whether war had erupted in the Donbas.
Commentators also use gray zone and its variations to describe China’s moves
to cement its extralegal territorial claims in the South China Sea against weaker
opponents, as well as Iranian moves in Syria and the Persian Gulf.
The popularization of the term gray zone appears to have been inspired by
its incorporation into military documents and speeches. The 2010 Quadrennial
Defense Review references challenges that occur in an “ambiguous gray area
that is neither fully war nor fully peace.”16 But it took the remarks delivered five
years later by General Joseph L. Votel, USA, the then head of Special Operations
Command, to bring the term into the public eye. He incorporated the concept
into his briefing to Congress on the unique challenges posed by Russia and the
Islamic State, noting that “our success in this environment will be determined
by our ability to adequately navigate conflicts that fall outside of the traditional
peace-or-war construct.”17
An article discussing “a ‘gray zone’ between traditional notions of war and
peace” appeared soon after.18 More publications quickly followed; they seem to
be an elaboration of General Votel’s remarks and to discuss conflicts “that fall
between the traditional war and peace duality.”19 Collectively, this work gave us
a generally accepted definition of the term. Other publications arrived before
the end of 2015.20 After these instances, use of the term exploded.21 One article
arguing for a place between peace and war did appear in August 2014, but it
does not mention a gray zone specifically.22 The earliest example of this delineation (which does not appear to underpin the key relevant literature) appeared
in a 1995 international law article that mentions “the gray zone between war
and peace.”23 Japan’s 2010 and 2013 National Defense Program Guidelines took a
slightly different tack, pointing out that “there are a growing number of so-called
‘gray-zone’ disputes—confrontations over territory, sovereignty, and economic
interests that do not escalate into wars.”24 There is also a related October 2014
Stars and Stripes article.25
The key academic text seems to be Michael J. Mazarr’s Mastering the Gray
Zone, which does not provide a sufficiently clear definition of the gray zone. The
best that can be derived from it is that a “new standard form of conflict” is emerging from “revisionist states” that are “competing below the threshold of major
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2020
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war.”26 Moreover, gray-zone war is defined in relation to an undefinable term:
major war.27 A commonly accepted definition of this in certain academic circles
is as follows: “Major war means an operation where the United States deployed
over fifty thousand troops and there were at least one thousand battle deaths.”28
This definition is arbitrary and means based, and thus unusable.
Mazarr derived the term—at least in part—from the work of the special operations community.29 But our inquiries have failed to determine any inspiration
for other recent American users of the term. It could derive from a 2005 book
by Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, American and Italian Marxist scholars,
respectively (Negri is a devotee and former student of Michel Foucault). Hardt
and Negri related the gray-zone concept to the post-Saddam Iraqi insurgency
and wrote that “most of the current military engagements of the United States
are unconventional conflicts or low-intensity conflicts that fall in the gray zone
between peace and war.”30 Ironically, here gray zone is used by critics of America
to describe what is seen as deliberate efforts to blur recognition of what is clearly
a military action: the occupation of a sovereign nation. Even more ironically,
Russian officials frequently depict hybrid war as something “the Americans do”
with “their advocacy of color revolutions”—which demonstrates the crossover
contagion effects of the use of both terms.31
GRAY-ZONE CONFLICT AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF THEORY
There are several fundamental problems with use of the term gray zone.32 The
first has to do with theoretical considerations. Again, the advocates of the
concept—whether or not they realize it, and whether or not they insist they are
doing so—are creating new theory about what is and is not war.33 The advocates
of the gray-zone conflict terminology fail this test because, as we will see, they are
not clarifying concepts but instead creating confusion.
As with some discussions of hybrid war, gray-zone publications haphazardly
swirl and mingle the levels of war. Mazarr mixes strategy and tactics when he calls
Chinese actions in the South China Sea the “use of gradual, multi-instrument
strategies,” then in the next sentence states that Russia’s moves against Ukraine
“also constitute a variety of the tactic,” and in the next sentence avers that Iran’s
search for regional power and nuclear weapons is “a variety of gray zone strategy.”
He also writes that “gray zone conflict involves the holistic application of a mosaic
of civilization and military tools, short of combat operations, to achieve gradual
progress toward political objectives.” Here, as in other places, the author is partly
writing about grand strategy, because he is examining the various tools of power
a nation can employ in pursuit of its political objective.34
All this produces a critical problem in logic. If you do not define your terms
and stick to a valid use of them, you have not presented a basis for rational
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol73/iss1/4
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discussion. Failing to differentiate among grand strategy, strategy, operations,
and tactics compounds this problem. A challenge on the tactical level must be
addressed in ways starkly different from those applicable to a strategic threat.
Mazarr also argues that revisionist powers “are creating a new approach to the
pursuit of aggressive aims, a new standard form of conflict” by undermining foes
gradually on their periphery.35 The reality is that there is nothing new here. The
Nazis used subversion to undermine Austria and Czechoslovakia before World
War II. This was a standard Soviet practice against NATO countries. Mazarr
himself writes that the ancient Greeks behaved in the manner now associated
with gray-zone conflict. Revisionist or aggressive powers certainly are a problem
today, but they always have been a problem and always will be.
None of this, of course, counters the fact that Mazarr and others indeed are
correct about the danger from revisionist states. But we must parse the problem
in a clearer manner to develop proper responses. If one identifies the problem
incorrectly, one very likely will deliver the wrong answer. The most important
and useful part of Mazarr’s text provides superb analysis of the threat to the
international order from several aggressive, revisionist powers. The challenges
from China and Russia today resemble those of the 1950s. Both the Soviet empire
and China had, on their respective borders, weak states that were not tied to any
alliance system. Both also had revolutionary, and thus revisionist, regimes, as
does Iran. Today, Russia, China, and Iran all have weak, often unaffiliated states
on their borders, or ungoverned or disputed areas, such as parts of the South
China Sea. The methods one uses to go about obtaining control of these areas
fall under the realms of grand strategy, strategy, operations, and tactics. It is also
here where the ideas of the original gray-zone writers, as we will see shortly, are
very applicable.
The gray zone, as Adam Elkus observes, is “just another example of the strategic studies community needlessly confusing itself by generating new terminology
to replace what is not broken.”36
THE GRAY ZONE’S FORGOTTEN HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS
What will come as a surprise to most is that the term gray areas in relation to conflict, particularly when dealing with Russia, has been around since at least 1954,
though in a different form from that generally used today. Thomas K. Finletter, a
World War I veteran, career U.S. government official, and the second Secretary of
the Air Force (1950–53), first discussed competition in the gray areas in his 1954
book Power and Policy in a section titled “The Struggle against Communism in
the Gray Areas.” Finletter defined the gray areas in a geographical sense, identifying “the countries outside of NATO which are in contact or nearly so with Russia
and China, the long frontier between Freedom and Communism starting from
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2020

9

Naval War College Review, Vol. 73 [2020], No. 1, Art. 4

STOKER & WHITESIDE

21

Turkey on the west, and leading eastward through Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan,
India, Burma, Thailand, Malaya, Indonesia, Formosa, Korea, and Japan to the
western limit of NATO in the Aleutian chain.”37 Today, Finletter’s description of
the strategic situation across this belt of the world is far more right than wrong.
Obviously, the periphery has changed a bit with the collapse of the Soviet Union,
so one should add the new states that have emerged in Central Asia and Eastern
Europe, but the situation still
is easily recognizable.
Calling something new and revolutionary
Finletter goes on to note
just because part of it takes place in the cyber
the
vulnerability of the gray
domain (which merely constitutes the next
areas and their importance,
evolution in signals-based elements of war
but also insists that the United
fighting that began with the telegraph) does
States cannot build a defense
not make it a new form of war[;] . . . it is at
system here along the lines of
best merely a form of tactical innovation.
NATO, because the arena is so
different. This makes it harder to develop ways of blocking “Communist [Russian] Imperialism in the Gray Areas.”38 Finletter’s remarks immediately bring to
mind the current situations in Central Asia and Eastern Europe, particularly in
Georgia but in Ukraine, Moldova, and Belarus as well. The vulnerable gray areas
lack the political and cultural similarities and economic ties linking post–Second
World War Western Europe, but just as in the 1940s and 1950s they face threats
from a revisionist Russia and growing China.
In his discussion Finletter asks a question particularly applicable to today.
“What are the guiding principles of the United States foreign policy for the Gray
Areas?” He poses a number of rhetorical questions to try to answer the concern
he raises, but then properly says that the political leadership must decide what
policy will be before one can determine military strategy for the gray areas.39 In
other words, how the United States seeks to handle these areas must be subsumed
under the nation’s larger political aims. The country’s grand strategy then should
be aligned with this.
There are certainly reasons to treat many of Finletter’s comments with a skeptical eye. He often gives too much credit to Soviet influence in China and to the
general reach of the Soviets and Chinese into what in the mid-1950s was called
the emerging Third World, but it is interesting that his fears are not unlike those
of current policy makers. For example, he frets about Iran’s tilt toward Russia,
something that is part of current policy discussion. He also notes that “the Russians have therefore moved their military pressures—actual and threatened—to
the Gray Areas.” The Russians are providing the equipment and training while
the Chinese, “acting as junior partners and the middlemen,” are (in regions such
as Southeast Asia) “threatening to move the barrier forward by force at many
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol73/iss1/4
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points.”40 Again, the picture he paints is in many ways familiar: Russia is pushing
using proxies, but China also is on the move.
Other authors quickly followed Finletter into the gray areas. Henry Kissinger,
in his 1955 Foreign Affairs article “Military Policy and Defense of the ‘Grey Areas,’”
credits Finletter’s work. Kissinger takes on the problems of Russian and Chinese
aggression in the same areas, particularly regarding the problems of deterrence
and the threat that military action here could lead to war between a Communist
aggressor and the United States. He urges that the “immediate task” of the United
States in this area “must be to shore up the indigenous will to resist” via political
and economic aid. He also argues for the creation of military forces in the most
vulnerable states that do not possess significant defensive power, and the necessity of the United States and others having the capability to come to their aid.41
For today’s audience a perhaps more useful take on the gray-areas issue is
found in political scientist Robert E. Osgood’s well-known 1957 book Limited
War: The Challenge to American Strategy. Osgood credits Finletter with developing the concept and includes in his work a section titled (not too surprisingly)
“Limited War in the Gray Areas”; he also tackles the subject on other pages.42
Osgood defines the gray areas as being “all around the Eurasian rimlands [sic]
from Iran to Korea,” calling it “a vast region contiguous to the Communist sphere
of power that was ripe for Communist expansion.” He fears “Communist pressure” against the “gray areas,” but is more concerned that events there would work
to separate the United States from its allies, as well as to siphon U.S. strength away
from more-important regions. He also worries that these areas lack the strength
to defend themselves against “determined Communist attack.”43 The substitution
of “Russian and Chinese” for “Communist” would align his statements with the
concerns of many in today’s U.S. strategic community.
Osgood built on Finletter’s concept and linked the threat to the gray areas to
the challenges of the containment strategy during the Cold War. He wrote that
containment in the gray areas would rest on the areas’ inhabitants and their respective abilities to defend their own states against the very threats that Ukraine
faces today: foreign subversion, infiltration, insurrection, and conventional
military attacks. Osgood also wisely observed that many of the states of the gray
areas lacked the internal structures and solidity to build the power to resist, even
with American military and economic help. To address this challenge, Osgood
offered “three general requirements” for containing Russia and China in the gray
areas. First, the “indigenous regimes” had to possess the “minimum internal cohesion and stability,” as well as “a minimum ability to satisfy social and economic
demands to prevent Communist ideological and political penetration.” Second,
these local states needed to have military forces that could deal with insurrections and guerrillas. Third, these same local military forces, when supported by
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2020
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U.S. military and economic aid as well as military units, provided the “nuclei” for
defeating “larger military incursions on a local basis.”44 In other words, the states
should demonstrate the desire and ability to govern and defend themselves, but
the United States should help those manifesting a core seriousness of purpose.
What is particularly interesting about Osgood’s statements is that over sixty
years later not only are the concerns the same but so are the actions the United
States is taking to address them. Moreover, this is exactly what the United States
has been doing for the past sixty-plus years, in some form or other—sometimes
with success, sometimes not.
There undoubtedly are many additional older sources discussing the gray areas that remain forgotten.45 For inspiration on how to deal with Vladimir Putin’s
Russia, as well as China and Iran, Cold War literature is something that current
security studies authors would be wise to examine.
There are other, later works depicting the gray zone in a geographical manner,
not unlike Finletter’s approach, that predate our core examples of Votel’s testimony and Mastering the Gray Zone. These include works from 1986, 1987, 1995,
and 1998, as well as a 1999 book chapter on NATO expansion that mentions a
“‘gray zone’ of insecurity.”46 A 2007 work uses the term in relation to electoral
reform.47 One 2004 source defines the gray zone as a type of threat.48 Others are
addressed below.
But what is most important to draw from this is that Finletter and his intellectual successors are describing a geographical and geopolitical challenge similar to
that which the United States faces today—without making the error of confusing
peace with war. They understood the difference—and they understood that the
costs of such a misunderstanding could be fatal.
THE GRAY ZONE INJURES OUR ABILITY TO DISTINGUISH
BETWEEN PEACE AND WAR
All this brings us back to a key argument made by gray-zone enthusiasts. “A fundamental implication of gray zone campaigns is to blur the dividing line between
peace and war, and between civilian and military endeavors. They are, in a sense,
the use of civilian instruments to achieve objectives sometimes reserved for military capabilities.”49 We will ignore the obvious confusing of a campaign and a war
to address the larger issue raised.
The problem is not that there is a blurring of the line between peace and war
in the behavior of aggressive actors. The problem is in the failure of analysts
and policy makers to understand the differences between war and peace and
the frequent conflation of acts of subversion, harassment, and espionage among
countries nominally and legally at peace with war. As discussed previously,
war is a distinct state in which violence is used to achieve political ends.
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol73/iss1/4
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While new domains or new fronts of competition frequently open in an age of
rapid technological proliferation, the division between war and peace remains
fixed despite the efforts of some to elide the difference. Thomas Rid brilliantly
addresses this issue in relation to so-called cyber war in an article appropriately
titled “Cyber War Will Not Take Place.” He argues, convincingly, that cyber attacks are acts of sabotage, espionage, or subversion lacking the violence necessary
to make them acts of war.50
Recalling the relationship between the pursuit of the political objective and the
elements of grand strategy presented earlier—grand strategy, again, meaning how
we use all the elements of national power in pursuit of a political aim—clarifies
this issue. For example, what Russia has done in Ukraine since 2014 is to conduct
successfully a war for limited political aims, using both active violent and subversive means. The failure of many political leaders to brand this war a war does not
alter the facts on the ground or prevent honest analysis.
But one must remember that the above-mentioned analytical tools apply to
both peace and war. Just because a state is not at war with a rival state, it does not
mean that the first state is not attempting to subvert the second. The Cold War
epitomized this. Currently, neither Russia nor China is at war with the United
States, despite many insistences to the contrary, but both constantly practice
forms of subversion against the United States, such as meddling in political
campaigns and all forms of hacking.51 All nations compete with one another, and
with regard to Russia and China one could brand them unfriendly U.S. competitors, or perhaps more accurately adversaries. But states compete with other states
even if they are not at war with them (i.e., actually involved in fighting them).
In the end, the problem is that analysts writing about the so-called gray zone are
confusing war with subversion (in the case of the U.S. relationship with Russia)
while forgetting (in the case of Russia’s war against Ukraine) that subversion
and its tools are used both in peace and in war. Russian expert Michael Kofman
noted in a Texas National Security Review roundtable on the U.S. National Defense Strategy that Russia’s “annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the almost entirely
conventional fighting continuing in Ukraine are hardly the product of emerging
technologies to subvert democratic processes, unless this is new jargon for tanks
and artillery.”52
If the most important role of political leaders is to get the political aims right
so that all else follows logically, an important consideration is the need for political and military leaders to communicate them clearly to friend and foe alike.
Identifying key national interests and drawing sharp redlines around them while
providing for their credible enforcement is key to avoiding situations that evoke
the label “gray-zone confrontation.”53 But this requires political leaders to understand what they want and to be clear and specific in their pronouncements.
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In March 2017, General Votel, then head of U.S. Central Command, briefed
the Senate Armed Services Committee. His command posture statement used
both “hybrid war” and “gray zone” in the official text. In addressing the danger
from the Islamic State, Votel described it as an “‘evolving’ hybrid threat (conventional and irregular warfare).” Switching gears, Votel detailed Iran’s bevy of
conventional and irregular threats and described Iran’s implementation of its
strategy for gaining regional hegemony as being “primarily within the ‘gray zone,’
the space short of conventional conflict where miscalculation can easily occur.”54
The continued use of these terms insists on the existence of a nonexistent
space between war and peace and risks the dangerous possibility that these acts
that take place beyond established redlines for action will generate a cause or
push for war. More likely, the angst over shadowy activities short of war by malevolent actors could push policy makers to counter minor threats to U.S. interests rashly, in ways that backfire or perhaps erode U.S. legitimacy as a global or
regional influencer of stability and prosperity. Not understanding the difference
between peace and war can cause miscalculations that land us in the latter.
THE SO-CALLED GRAY ZONE UNDERMINES
U.S. STRATEGIC THINKING
The flawed gray-zone concept undermines U.S. strategic thinking in two manners. First, U.S. government political and strategic planners and analysts are
assessing adversaries and writing official U.S. government policy and strategy
documents—as well as influential reports and policy papers—on the basis of a
dangerously flawed idea. Second, gray-zone thinking provides America’s adversaries with a means of undermining the liberal international order.
The penetration of gray-zone thinking into the policy and strategy debates of
the United States has been immense. It is nearly impossible to attend a defenserelated presentation in Washington, DC, without hearing “gray zone” references.55 More dangerous is the gray zone’s infiltration into official U.S. political
and defense documents. We noted above its first official appearance in the 2010
Quadrennial Defense Review.56 This was only the start, as the concept began finding its way into all manner of official U.S. civilian and military publications. It
reached the Army’s Unified Land Operations manual in 2011 and the Army Training and Doctrine Command’s Operational Environments to 2028 in 2012.57 The
key source is General Votel’s aforementioned 2015 congressional testimony.58
A 2017 National Intelligence Council report discusses the gray zone.59 The official, unclassified 2018 National Defense Strategy summary does not contain
the term, but the congressionally mandated analysis of the document includes
voluminous references to hybrid war and the gray zone; indeed, one could argue
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that the gray zone is key to its intellectual foundation.60 Moreover, an extensive
(152-page) assessment project released in May 2019 is underpinned completely
by the gray-zone concept, as well as hybrid war. The report has twenty-four different contributors from numerous U.S. military commands and influential think
tanks, and includes prefaces by the head of the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine
Command, a Navy rear admiral on the Joint Staff, and a European Command
civilian expert on Russia.61
The term gray zone also commonly appears in defense-related congressional
briefings, often in conjunction with hybrid war. In March 2017, a RAND employee testified before Congress in what was generally a discussion of Russian
actions against other states. His remarks clearly illustrate the problem.
[E]xperts use the term “hybrid warfare” in different ways, including several related
terms such as “gray zone strategies,” “competition short of conflict,” “active measures,”
and “new generation warfare.” Despite subtle differences, all these terms point to the
same thing: Russia is using multiple instruments of power and influence, sometimes
with an emphasis on nonmilitary tools, to pursue its national interests outside its
borders—often at the expense of US interests and those of US allies.62

He went on to add—correctly—that these actions are not new; the Soviet
Union acted similarly during the Cold War.63
If there is nothing new here, then why needlessly complicate matters with
a new concept or a new theory? Simply call things as they are. The same witness then brands what the Russians are doing “tactics” and suggests “strategies”
for dealing with them, then refers to “hybrid war tactics” and “hybrid warfare
strategies.”64 Is it hybrid or gray? And should we not develop tactics to counter
tactics and strategies to counter strategies?
Why does this matter? Because U.S. leaders are analyzing potential threats to
the United States and constructing elements of American strategy on the basis
of an intellectual construct that has no analytical utility and confuses war with
peace. With this, we have resurrected part of our previous point. Moreover, the
danger in doing this is that one will construct and then try to implement strategies that are inappropriate for the situation at hand. The United States might
commit an act of war—attacking a special operations unit or blockading a newly
constructed island—under the assumption that one is “fighting in the gray zone,”
when in reality the nations actually are at peace. The United States might think
of itself as being in the gray zone—the area between peace and war—but to the
other nation the situation could be crystal clear: it is now at war with the United
States. Shoddy thinking could produce horrific consequences.
Additionally, America’s adversaries find the gray zone useful for their purposes. The propagators of the gray zone seem unaware that some Russian writers
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find our addiction to a variation of this concept particularly useful. How much is
not clear, but the problem must be considered. Russian political scientist Dmitry
Baluev argues that the acceptance of political gray zones allows the Russians to
introduce national security concepts “that differ from the traditional international system and depart from western dominated international relations theory.”
This “will be most useful for analysis of political and economic developments in
south-east Asia” because these societies are different and face different threats.
He also argues that the West needs to accept the diversity of the different governing principles of this region.65
Baluev’s reasoning is in many respects very broken, and it is difficult to see
how one translates his ideas into action. What is particularly interesting is that
Baluev (with a coauthor) has been writing about this since at least 2010—five
years before Votel and Mazarr—and says that his gray-zone ideas are derived
from those advanced by Americans.66 But the more dangerous and important
issue is this: one Russian thinker sees in confused Western analysis a means of
delegitimizing democracy and undermining the international order. While this is
not indicative of all Russian thought, by any means, it is an approach dangerous
to the United States and its interests.
Having discussed thoroughly our issues with the concept of the gray zone, we
move on to the other half of our discussion: hybrid war.
HYBRID WAR—A NEW TERM FOR NEW WARS?
We can distinguish hybrid war from the gray zone by the fact that instead of
describing a shadowy space where an alleged pseudowar is taking place, hybrid
war pretends to describe the character of activities during what is clearly war
among two or more entities. These activities take place at the tactical level of
war, and analysts detail them so they can categorize the tools as a mix of conventional and irregular in the same space. The continual expansion of diverse tools
and examples is considered evidence of the existence of hybrid war, a term now
used to describe nearly every form of interstate competition and conflict from
the tactical to the political. The result has been to confuse rather than clarify our
understanding of war.
The urtext of hybrid war is Frank G. Hoffman’s 2007 Conflict in the 21st
Century, although he first broached the issue in an article coauthored in 2005
with now-former Secretary of Defense James Mattis.67 Moreover, it would be
patently unfair to blame Hoffman for the proliferation of this term, as more
than a decade’s worth of writers have exploited the existence of hybrid war
and its variants in a dizzying number of articles and policy papers.68 Professor
Robert Johnson, the director of the University of Oxford’s Changing Character
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of War Centre, noted at a 2017 conference that he had surveyed more than one
hundred articles on the topic.69 Some of the authors seem to have carried things
much further than originally intended. Surprisingly, given what is noted above,
the term does not make it into Mattis’s own summary of the National Defense
Strategy in 2018.70
Some authors credit the first use of the term to a master’s thesis written in
1998 by Lieutenant Robert G. Walker, USN.71 Walker defined hybrid warfare
(not hybrid war) as that “which lies in the interstices between special and conventional warfare. This type of warfare possesses characteristics of both the special and conventional realms
[B]y confusing competition among adversaries and re quires an ext reme
amount of flexibility in orwith things called hybrid or gray-zone war,
der to transition operationwe risk conflating everything with war—a
ally and tactically between
dangerous proposition.
the special and conventional
arenas.” Walker’s text makes clear he is using hybrid as an adjective and not seeking to establish an entirely new form or type of war. To quote from his thesis:
“[T]hroughout its history, the United States Marine Corps has demonstrated
itself to be a hybrid force, capable of conducting operations within both the conventional and unconventional realms of warfare.”72
The term reappeared in another Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) thesis four
years later. In this text, hybrid war is defined as guerrilla warfare circa 2002, and
the Chechen wars are held up as the historical examples. Here the term was inspired by works on so-called fourth-generation warfare and the “New Wars” thesis of Mary Kaldor. These consider hybrid war to be made up of conventional and
unconventional means, crime, terrorism, subversion, and technological innovation. But this means-based foundation is too subjective and inexact to provide
a basis for analysis.73 The claim is also ahistorical, in the sense that the authors
purport to identify something new.74 The 2002 NPS work does not cite Walker’s
1998 thesis, carrying the first known appearance of the term, and Conflict in the
21st Century does not reference it.
Further uses of the term, as well as many variations, soon followed. It appeared in a pair of articles in 2006, again used as an adjective to describe tactical
matters.75 Hoffman penned a quartet of hybrid-related texts in 2006 and 2007
that largely set the foundations for increased use of the concept.76 A 2007 work
used the term to describe threats to the United States and to critique the 2005
National Defense Strategy.77 John Arquilla, the director of the Walker thesis mentioned above and who also chaired the department under whose umbrella the
two NPS theses mentioned above were written, used the term as an adjective to
describe warfare in 2007.78 The same year also saw the term’s first appearance in
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an official U.S. government publication, A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century
Seapower, which probably was influenced by the 2005 Mattis and Hoffman text
and Hoffman’s work at the Marine Corps’s Center for Emerging Threats and Opportunities. Here, hybrid is an adjective describing tactical matters.79 Hybrid war
also appeared in British doctrine and an Australian writing the same year, as an
adjective related to irregular warfare.80
After the publication of the 2007 Hoffman text, use of the term hybrid war
rapidly accelerated.81 For example, in a 2008 article, Army Chief of Staff General
George C. Casey wrote about hybrid threats, which betrayed “diverse, dynamic
combinations of conventional, irregular, terrorist, and criminal capabilities.”
This, he said, would “make pursuit of singular approaches difficult, necessitating innovative, hybrid solutions involving new combinations of all elements of
national power.”82 Yet the idea of using and combining all the aspects of national
power to achieve political objectives is an ancient one, and the failure of the former service chief ’s declaration to acknowledge that is surprising.
Others have noted this 2009 remark by Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates:
“One can expect to see more tools and tactics of destruction—from the sophisticated to the simple—being employed simultaneously in hybrid and more complex forms of warfare.” Here, Secretary Gates used “hybrid” as a simple adjectival
descriptor for tactical issues.83 This, though, changed by the time of Gates’s 2010
Quadrennial Defense Review.84 Here, hybrid first appears in a section titled “The
Shifting Operational Landscape.” But it appears as hybrid threats, which are defined as “diverse, dynamic combinations of conventional, irregular, terrorist, and
criminal capabilities.”85
But what does hybrid war mean? In 2007, Hoffman provided the following
definition—the foundation for the hybrid war texts that followed it: “Hybrid
Wars incorporate a range of different modes of warfare, including conventional
capabilities, irregular tactics and formations, terrorist acts including indiscriminate
violence and coercion, and criminal disorder. These multi-modal activities can be
conducted by separate units, or even by the same unit, but are generally operationally and tactically directed and coordinated within the main battlespace to
achieve synergistic effects” (italics in the original).86
At first glance, this definition seems entirely workable, and an accurate description of a growing number of battlefields and hot spots around the world.
But it is hard to think of a single characteristic of war, particularly at the tactical
level, that does not fit within it. If this is true, hybrid war becomes a redundant
term; it simply constitutes war as we always have known it. Moreover, as we will
see, the term introduces nothing different from what the United States and other
Western countries have encountered from adversaries historically, or even what
they have done to others in the conduct of war.
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HYBRID WAR AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF MILITARY THEORY
Theory clarifies concepts while serving as a basis for analysis. When one first
encounters a newly constructed military term, it should be tested immediately
against the foundational concepts of political-military analysis and checked
against history. This will establish its validity. Using this methodology, what is
hybrid war? And how useful is it as theory?
Hybrid war is at best simply a neologism for tactical innovation. Moreover,
the theoretical problem is compounded when one digs deeper into the key texts.
It is unclear whether hybrid war is supposed to refer to war, warfare, or a threat.
For example, hybrid threats may be “competitors who will employ all forms of
war and tactics, perhaps simultaneously,” as well as “criminal activity.”87 This explanation is followed by the following: “[H]ybrid threats incorporate a full range
of different modes of warfare.” The same paragraph adds that “Hybrid Wars can
be conducted by both states and a variety of non-state actors.”88 In a 2009 article
we find the following: “It appears that CW [compound war] is the more frequent
type, and that hybrid threats are simply a subcomponent of CW in which the
degree of coordination or fusion occurs at lower levels.”89 This describes hybrid
war as a subtype of compound war, which is simply an expression of the reality
that nations use a variety of military means to fight wars.
One can boil down the core discussion of hybrid war to the usage of tactical
means, something revealed in the fact that sometimes the works focus on infantry weapons. When one is discussing the use of antitank weaponry, you are in the
tactical realm.90 This is fine in and of itself, but it hardly reveals a new form of
war, or even a new threat. This also can be seen in an elaboration on the original
hybrid war entry: “I define a hybrid threat as: Any adversary that simultaneously
and adaptively employs a fused mix of conventional weapons, irregular tactics,
terrorism, and criminal behavior in the battle space to obtain their political
objectives.”91 This is simply a depiction of tactical means and methods that creates an arbitrary distinction with little explanatory value beyond what is useful
for tactical-level commanders fighting in multiple directions.92
Additionally, some hybrid war works insist on having identified a new type of
war.93 This is simply not the case, as even most hybrid enthusiasts would agree.
As we have seen, all wars—as both Clausewitz and Corbett tell us—are fought for
regime change (an unlimited political objective), or something less than this (a
limited political objective). All wars can be lumped under this rubric. Hybridists
work from a means- or methods-based foundation, one that is too subjective to
provide a definable, firm, universally applicable basis for analysis—thus failing a
key test for building theory.
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Finally, hybridists are partly imitating an earlier intellectual infatuation. Conceptually, U.S. defense officials advanced something similar to hybrid war before,
although under a different name, when faced with new and heated geopolitical
competition after 1945. In 1951, U.S. Navy captain Harvey B. Seim wrote about
what he called fringe war. This, he noted in the context of the Cold War, “is localized, yet global; it consists primarily of a series of minor engagements for limited
objectives; it is carried out by relatively small forces; it utilizes puppet or satellite
groups as a smokescreen to mask the single coordinated communist effort; it is
waged in many different manners, both military and non-military.”94 This reads
like a description of many modern conflicts from some hybrid and gray-zone
enthusiasts, who often conflate the distinct definitions of the two concepts and
focus on the small forces, deception, and military and nonmilitary “modes,” without any focus on the political nature of the dispute or conflict.
So, where does this leave us? Discussions of hybrid war invariably mix the
realms and tools of conflict, with a focus on the tactical level of war. Calling
something new and revolutionary just because part of it takes place in the cyber
domain (which merely constitutes the next evolution in signals-based elements
of war fighting that began with the telegraph) does not make it a new form of
war. As stated above, it is at best merely a form of tactical innovation. Theory is
supposed to clarify issues and improve our analysis, but the hybridists have only
sown confusion by trying to create a new type of war to describe the constantly
shifting character of war.
HYBRID WAR: DISTORTED HISTORY
Arguments for the uniqueness of hybrid war as a concept and for an increase in
its occurrence in practice often are supported by a selective reading of history.
In Hoffman’s original work that helped define the term hybrid war, the Vietnam,
Napoleonic, and American Revolutionary Wars are given as examples of conflicts
that cannot be classified as hybrid wars, because the different “modes” of warfare
do not merge at the tactical level.95 This assertion is disputable, particularly when
we rely on his popular definition of hybrid war.
The very nature of North Vietnam’s effort to unify the country forcibly under
Communist rule constituted the blending and use, simultaneously, of every type
of military and nonmilitary element that one possibly could imagine. Indeed, the
essence of North Vietnamese grand strategy was the integration of all elements of
national power working toward the political objective at every level of war. The
entire state—military and civilian—was mobilized to achieve the political aim.
“Vietnamese Communist Revolutionary Warfare” combined armed dau tranh
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FIGURE 2
SCHEMATIC OF VIETNAMESE COMMUNIST REVOLUTIONARY WARFARE
GRAND STRATEGY

Note: dau tranh means “struggle.”
Source: Pike, Viet Cong, p. 212.

(struggle) with political dau tranh. All effort was to act upon the enemy.96 Figure
2 illustrates this.
It is important to distinguish the term grand strategy—meaning the use of
all elements of national power to achieve political objectives—from the use of
a variety of means at the tactical level. Terrorism and criminality in the forms
of kidnapping and assassination were tactics integral to the Communist effort
to topple South Vietnam’s government and drive out its foreign sponsor.97 The
Communist North also practiced constant subversion against South Vietnam.
The memoir of a North Vietnamese Communist agent working in South Vietnam
provides only one example of this.98

Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2020

21

Naval War College Review, Vol. 73 [2020], No. 1, Art. 4

STOKER & WHITESIDE

33

Vietcong (VC) units habitually fought alongside North Vietnamese regular
units in South Vietnam. Moreover, the VC itself was hardly monolithic, possessing Main Force formations made up of light infantry units fighting beside fulltime and part-time VC guerrillas. North Vietnamese army forces also regularly
fought as guerrillas in South Vietnam.99 After the near evisceration of the VC
during the 1968 Tet Offensive and its subsidiary offensive operations in 1969,
inclusion of North Vietnamese army forces was common in decimated VC units
fighting the guerrilla war in South Vietnam.100
The blending of the regular and irregular during the Napoleonic Wars was also
habitual. After Napoléon’s 1812 invasion of Russia, Russian militia continuously
fought alongside Russian regular army forces.101 After Prussia broke with Napoléon in early 1813, Prussian militia (Landwehr) commonly filled out Prussian
units until Napoléon’s second abdication, in 1815. Carl von Clausewitz helped
raise these units in 1813. Indeed, the plans for doing so were ones he originally
authored.102
The blending of modes of warfare was prevalent during the American Revolutionary War. After the debacle of his defeat in New York in 1776, George Washington habitually used regular and irregular forces simultaneously. This is made
very clear in numerous books, as well as in Washington’s correspondence.103 In
June 1777, he wrote from his camp in New Jersey as follows: “My design is to collect all the force that can possibly be drawn from other quarters to this post, so
as to reduce the security of this army to the greatest certainty possible, and to be
in a condition of embracing any fair opportunity, that may offer, to make an attack on advantageous terms. In the mean time I intend by light Bodies of militia,
seconded and encouraged by a few Continental Troops, to harass and diminish
their number by continual Skirmishes.”104
American general Nathanael Greene wrote something similar in 1781 when he
commanded the American forces opposing the British invasion of the southern
states.
The Salvation of this country don’t [sic] depend upon little strokes, nor should the
great business of establishing a permanent army be neglected to pursue them. Partizan strokes in war are like the garnish of a table. . . . They are most necessary and
should not be neglected, and yet, they should not be pursued to the prejudice of more
important concerns. You may strike a hundred strokes and reap little benefit from
them, unless you have a good Army to take advantage of your success. . . . It is not a
war of posts but a contest for states.105

The Americans used regular and irregular methods and forces throughout
the struggle, often in the same battle, famously deploying Daniel Morgan’s riflemen as a dispersed sharpshooting unit in the otherwise conventional Battle of
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Saratoga.106 Moreover, if one was feeling particularly ungenerous to our founding
father, one could define Washington’s requisitions of supplies after 1780 as crime
because the Americans were so broke that Washington took what he needed
without making payment.107
The hybrid conversation perhaps has been linked most heavily to the war
Russia launched against Ukraine in 2014, but the infection quickly spread to discussions of the Islamic State’s war. In the case of the Islamic State, just as in every other
example held up as hybrid, there is nothing new here. Just like its insurrectionist
predecessors, the Islamist group took pages from the “Revolutionary Warfare”
and protracted war playbooks of the Vietnamese Communists and China’s Mao
Zedong.108 The Islamic State moved through Mao’s three phases, from weak insurgency to conventional war, using all military and political means—from terrorism and drones to recruiting former Baathists, in the manner of the Bolsheviks
building the Red Army—and then wrapping it all in an effective informationoperations campaign, using social media instead of just a printing press.109 While
many current insurgency scholars argue for a divorce from the Maoist concepts,
as supposedly being outdated in our globalized age, they fail to credit the Islamic
State’s ability to garner large amounts of local and global popular support in its
campaign to create a political entity called a caliphate.110 The reality is that the
group uses small, conventional units in conjunction with irregular forces to apply
coercion and violence to achieve political aims using a variety of tactics. Again,
there is nothing new here. Despite this, in article after article commentators debate the means and methods of the Islamic State way of war as if it heralded the
first case of a nonstate actor adopting so-called hybrid formations and tactics.111
The strongest argument that hybridists could make is that all wars are hybrid, but to varying degrees. Retired U.S. Army officer and historian Antulio
Echevarria writes, “It is worth asking whether history can provide examples of
wars that were not hybrid in some way.”112 All wars are—in the sense that they
mix conventional and unconventional fighting modes and methods and include
criminality and subversion—hybrid (as an adjective), but this does not create a
new creature. But if all wars are hybrid wars, the term is redundant, similar to
saying violent wars.
HYBRID WAR DANGEROUSLY CONFUSES PEACE AND WAR
Despite its creator’s intention to use the term hybrid war to describe acts that
are clearly warfare, it instead has become popular to use it in the opposite sense,
as a way to describe a supposed new way of war that deliberately blurs the lines
between peace and war. A factor in the accelerated use of the term hybrid war
was the publication of a 2013 article by the chief of the Russian General Staff,
General Valery Gerasimov. Mark Galeotti drew attention to this article in his
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initial writings on what he called the Gerasimov Doctrine—something he walked
back later in a subsequent article titled “I’m Sorry for Creating the ‘Gerasimov
Doctrine.’”113 In many Western eyes, the general authored a blueprint for a unique
campaign style that accurately describes Russian aggression against Ukraine. Yet
there is no such thing as a Gerasimov Doctrine. Among other things, Gerasimov
was simply giving his view of the operational environment and what a future war
might look like; he was not attempting to construct anything else.114
What makes this particularly interesting is that Gerasimov’s work is itself a
misreading of events. He deems the Arab Spring a military event, which it was
not. He insists that “the very ‘rules of war’ have changed.” They have not (one
could make an excellent argument that there are no rules). He also says that
nonmilitary means “in many
cases . . . have exceeded the
[P]art of the cure for a poor understanding
power of force and weapons
of some of our geopolitical problems is not to
confuse geopolitics, competition among adver- in their effectiveness,” but
gives no example of this. 115
saries, or . . . influence efforts with war.
Gerasimov then says that “the
focus of applied methods of conflict has altered in the direction of the broad
use of political, economic, informational, humanitarian, and other nonmilitary
measures—applied in coordination with the protest potential of the population.”
He then adds, “All of this is supplemented by military means of a concealed character, including carrying out actions of informational conflict and the actions
of special-operations forces. The open use of forces—often under the guise of
peacekeeping and crisis regulation—is resorted to only at a certain state, primarily for the achievement of final success in the conflict.”116 (As an aside, Gerasimov
apparently delivered a speech in Moscow in early November 2017 in which he
insisted that the United States and other Western forces were using hybrid war
against Russia.)117 At its core, all this is a rendition of grand strategy, meaning the
use of various elements of national power in the pursuit of political objectives.
The concealment of the military means is covered by Sun Tzu’s approximately
2,500-year-old insistence that “[a]ll warfare is based upon deception.”118 We also
could classify this under Clausewitz’s examination of cunning, which, it is important to point out, he says is a tool of the weak.119
The confusion of peace and war on our part arises from our manner of interpreting Gerasimov’s highlighting of the tactical use of subversion against
other states, something stressed in some hybridist works. American analysts
are forgetting that subversion is a tool both of peacetime state interaction and
of war. Believing that subversion is restricted to wartime activities, and classifying it as an act of war, clouds our thinking. Historically, subversion has always
been a part of both Russian foreign policy and military action.120 Moreover, the
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above-mentioned use of disguised military forces prior to open hostilities is an
act of war regardless of whether the power using them admits it or other nations
fail to properly brand it such. Putin’s Russia fought—and is still fighting, as of
2019—a war against Ukraine.
THE HYBRID WAR CONCEPT UNDERMINES
U.S. STRATEGIC THINKING
The unfortunate result of this intellectual confusion is the construction of elements of U.S. strategy on myth and misunderstanding and the militarization of
grand strategy, producing what the late strategic analyst Michael Handel referred
to as the tacticization of strategy.121 U.S. leaders have taken a badly formed tactical
concept and used it as one of the pillars for the creation of strategy. Tactics and
strategy are in the same arena, but they are different animals.
We see this in the fact that the notion of hybrid war made its way into the
2015 U.S. National Military Strategy, where it sat on an unusable “Continuum
of Conflict” consisting of “State Conflict,” “Hybrid Conflict,” and “Non-state
Conflict.”122 This document insists that hybrid conflict “blends conventional and
irregular forces to create ambiguity, seize the initiative, and paralyze the adversary. May include use of both traditional military and asymmetric systems.”123
The first problem with this definition—and this criticism fits the document’s
descriptions for state and nonstate conflict—is that this is an expression of the
means and methods used to wage war—two very subjective creations—and
therefore presents no foundation for constructive analysis. This critical weakness
is compounded by the fact that the definition given for hybrid war—which one
could construe as the official U.S. military and government line, because of its
source—is tactical in nature. All warfare blends conventional and irregular forces
and traditional and “asymmetric systems.” War’s very nature creates ambiguity,
and seizing the initiative is part of the job when waging a war, as is paralyzing
the enemy. There is nothing here that has not been practiced since ancient times.
Thucydides would have defined this as simply war.
The 2017 U.S. European Command posture statement contains no mention of
either term, but this did not prevent the chair of the U.S. House Armed Services
Committee from starting the question-and-answer period of the command’s
annual briefing to Congress with his concerns about the “hybrid warfare” occurring in Europe, from “little green men in Ukraine to political assassinations . . .
to buying influence and political parties, snap exercises to intimidate neighbors,
and of course cyber-attacks of various kinds.”124 Linking together a wide range
of acts in multiple domains, in and out of conflict zones, serves to confuse more
than clarify—which is certainly the result here.
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Unfortunately, terms such as hybrid war have gained enough currency not
only to pollute U.S. policy and strategy documents but also to corrupt the nonU.S. military lexicon. A German writer appropriated the idea to examine Iranian
actions, institutions such as the Austrian National Defence Academy have hosted
conferences partly dedicated to examining it, and a Dutch library published a bibliography on the topic.125 One also easily can find Spanish articles on the topic.126
Fortunately, not everyone is buying what is being sold. A French author branded
hybrid war nothing more than a revival of the indirect approach discussed by B. H.
Liddell Hart and French theorist André Beaufre.127 The statement is incorrect,
because Liddell Hart was discussing strategy, not tactics, but this demonstrates
the chain of intellectual devastation that has been wrought.
Historian Hew Strachan provides a particularly cogent skewering of “the
current jargon,” noting that “asymmetry and hybridisation have become catchalls applied to any war in which the two sides have not been made up of armies
organised and equipped on similar lines.”128 Theorist Colin Gray writes that “the
trouble with the hybrid war concept is that it encourages the innovative theorist to venture without limit into the swamp of inclusivity, indeed of a form of
encyclopedism.”129 Hybrid war becomes everything; thus it is nothing.
Discussions of hybrid war are simply discussions of the means and methods of
waging war. This is nothing new, it is nothing exotic, it is nothing original. Studying the means and methods of warfare is critically important, but trying to make
it something other than what it is by creating an illogical, imaginary category
of war is an example of cloudy and potentially dangerous reasoning. If we focus
laser-like on the means and methods, we forget what the war is about. Hybrid war
as a term injures rather than aids our ability to do practical strategic analysis and
leads to the construction of strategy on the basis of tactics. It also encourages the
militarization of other elements of grand strategy while driving us to view every
geopolitical act through a warlike lens. This should encourage us further to move
away from use of this term. Thus far, if Russian maskirovka (deception) has succeeded, it is only because we have fooled ourselves.
BUT WHY DO WE THINK THIS WAY?
American leaders since the end of the Second World War too often have chased
buzzwords and their related intellectual debris. They also have minimized the
immense problems related to waging war by using euphemisms for it; “signaling”
and “modernization” in relation to the Vietnam War come instantly to mind.
Such terms almost invariably manifest as an expression of means. The result of
this is analysis of wars bereft of any political context (something Clausewitz railed
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against as early as 1815), and sometimes the launching of wars without calling
them wars or having any idea of what victory means.130 Moreover, by confusing
competition among adversaries with things called hybrid or gray-zone war, we
risk conflating everything with war—a dangerous proposition. If we are at war
with another country, our citizens rightly can ask what exactly we are doing about
it. If it is merely heated competition and international politics, meaning who
gets what, when, and where, then elements of national power other than force or
threats to use force will have to be relied on to a larger degree—and this seems
to be the root of American leaders’ problem. For too long unchallenged by states
with near-peer levels of economic or military might, the United States needs to
relearn how to compete with other states in the international arena. Even better,
it should relish the competition in the hopes of inspiring innovation and internal
improvements—something quite natural to the American character when the
polity is vigorous and healthy. Since no one is anywhere close to describing the
United States as such at present, the confusion over what is competition and what
is war is likely a symptom of an ailing U.S. political elite.
Another reason for the proliferation of new jargon on war is an ever-decreasing
level of knowledge of military history, a point addressed in an article by Lukas
Milevski.131 It is easy to insist that one has created something new or even developed a new concept or theory in the military realm if one’s knowledge of military
history and history in general is insufficient. A second and related problem is a
poor knowledge of military theory, particularly of the standard works such as
Clausewitz’s On War and Sun Tzu’s Art of War, as well as past doctrinal practices.
The related misuse of these works is perhaps a greater factor than an ignorance
of them, particularly of Clausewitz’s On War. A third issue is the not-alwaysbeneficial drive to develop something new in academic circles. This is particularly
true in the international affairs and political science realms, where too often there
is professional pressure to develop another microtheory to explain an element of
political or military behavior or practice, and then to fit history into it rather than
to analyze the past to see what patterns develop and what we can learn.
Worse is that war, for many in the West, has become an exercise in risk management, which means that leaders are no longer concerned with the war’s political aims.132 If we are not worried about the aims, or perhaps do not even know
what they are because we have lost our ability to think clearly about war, we forget
how important it is to win wars, and thus to end them with agreement on or the
imposition of a better peace.
In his critique of the concept of “fourth-generation warfare,” soldier-scholar Antulio Echevarria gives some advice applicable to discussion of so-called hybrid
and gray-zone wars as well as other flawed notions. Pushing these ideas is “an
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activity that only saps intellectual energy badly needed elsewhere,” and their proponents should stop spending their time “advancing or reinventing a bankrupt
theory.”133 And the U.S. government and think tanks should stop funding research projects supporting work that is injurious to American strategic thinking
(although our adversaries will be very happy to see this wastage continue). The
problem is that too many of the people writing about these subjects, as well as
those publishing them, either lack the tools to evaluate systematically what they
are publishing or simply do not care.
The solution to this problem is simple: a return to the core principles of strategic analysis recounted above. No matter the conflict or adversary, the analysis
must begin with an honest identification of the political objectives of all the
actors involved. We must differentiate between war and peace, and properly
identify the arenas of power within which we are operating. Moreover, when new
terms appear—and they will—they must be tested immediately against history
and existing theory. Most new so-called classifications of war would be instantly
killed if properly examined through these lenses.
We need to relearn how to think about war and peace and remember the obvious fact that competition occurs in both arenas. The end of the Cold War brought
new actors willing to challenge American hegemony and the resultant international order. As historian and strategic analyst Brad Lee put it, “We are now in an
era when the United States can no longer expect to overcome its problems with
sheer material superiority or overwhelming military force.”134 While America’s
strategic reality has changed, the worldview of U.S. policy makers seemingly
has not. Inheriting an international order that is based on “cooperative security
among states that shared [America’s] domestic political principles,” these politicians and their advisers are surprised continually by actors who buck the principles of cooperation and instead demonstrate hostile intent toward significant
U.S. interests.135 The pushback from nonrogue states creates an uncomfortable
disconnect between political aims and reality, driving the reflexive use of vague
terms such as hybrid warfare and the gray zone among frustrated (and often unaware) practitioners and policy makers.
The U.S. pattern of misjudging its adversaries has grown since 1990; from
surprise at the rise of nonstate actors declaring war on the United States to
multiple failed resets with a former superpower determined to right perceived
past wrongs, multiple American administrations have continued to look past
or attempt to wish away determined opponents.136 More recently, U.S. leaders
misjudged, if not resisted acknowledging, the Islamic State’s rise and its ability to
achieve its political goal of establishing a caliphate in the aftermath of a trilliondollar nation-building project, while simultaneously assuming that a rising regional power in the Pacific would be a responsible stakeholder and partner in the
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international order. China’s recent land-reclamation projects in the South China
Sea—blatantly situated in the exclusive economic zones of its neighbors and contrary to international law—expose the flawed and hopeful assessments that have
fueled American foreign policy and grand strategy. What we need are concepts
that clarify and inform our thinking, not muddy our intellectual waters and make
it more difficult to pursue our political aims peacefully as well as to wage our
wars. The 2017 U.S. National Security Strategy seems to be a belated recognition
by some policy elites that the United States has been caught in an extended period
of wishful thinking, of hoping that its competitors would see the advantage of an
American-led world order and refrain from challenging it when and where they
could. The new strategy clearly labels countries that are challenging U.S. power
and interests and ones that are destabilizing their respective regions.137
At a late-2017 conference at the Austrian National Defence Academy, in Vienna, which focused heavily on hybrid war and included dozens of speakers from
the United States and Europe, the Austrian general who delivered the closing
remarks said that Austria should not pay too much attention to things coming
out of American think tanks. Americans should consider taking his advice, especially if the documents are larded with terms that unhelpfully confuse and distort
already-complex human endeavors.138 Before the attacks on September 11, 2001,
the buzzwords were transformation, net-centric warfare, and the revolution in
military affairs. Hybrid war and the gray zone soon will follow them into oblivion,
perhaps helped by the new grand strategy documents that identify malignant actors and actions threatening to U.S. national interests.
To summarize, policy makers and their advisers, when analyzing threats
to U.S. national interests, apply variations of the unclear and poorly defined
terms hybrid war and gray zone to describe the intents as well as the actions of
global, regional, and nonstate actors, whether we are at war with them or not,
and regardless of whether the discussion focuses on political or criminal acts,
and regardless of whether military action is occurring in the tactical, operational,
strategic, or grand strategic realms. This is not merely unhelpful, it is dangerous;
worse, it communicates that American strategic analysis is like castles made of
sand, soon to disappear, then only to be remade frantically again and again.
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